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HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO: WHY
VOLUNTARY POST-PETITION 401(k) CONTRIBUTIONS ARE
DISPOSABLE INCOME
ABSTRACT
Following the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the majority of
chapter 13 debtors have been successful in minimizing their repayment
obligations to creditors while bolstering their financial stability during
retirement. The Bankruptcy Code allows chapter 13 debtors to retain their assets
and repay their debts to creditors using their earned income. Alternatively,
debtors may simply avoid some of the liability by dedicating a portion of their
earned income for reasonably necessary expenses. Judicial inconsistencies have
emerged concerning whether voluntary post-petition 401(k) retirement
contributions for chapter 13 debtors constitute disposable income in accordance
with Sections 541(b)(7) and 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
A majority of courts follow the Johnson approach, whereby all post-petition
401(k) contributions are excluded from a debtor’s disposable income, and
therefore out of reach for creditors. Other bankruptcy courts follow the Prigge
approach, whereby post-petition 401(k) contributions are included as
disposable income available to creditors. Still other courts follow the Seafort
approach, whereby post-petition 401(k) contributions are excluded from
disposable income only if such contributions were made pre-petition.
This Comment argues that excluding post-petition 401(k) contributions from
the debtor’s disposable income available to creditors—the approach followed
by most courts—undermines the “fresh start” goal of consumer bankruptcy.
After highlighting the shortcomings of the current post-petition 401(k)
contribution analysis, this Comment suggests that there lies a strong argument
for including post-petition 401(k) contributions in a debtor’s disposable income,
thereby curbing the opportunity for abuse and restoring the balance between
debtors and creditors.
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INTRODUCTION
Allowing a debtor to deduct her voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions
from the disposable income available to her creditors under her chapter 13
repayment plan creates an opportunity for abuse. The facts in Davis v. Helbling
(In re Davis) illustrate this point:
In 2017, Camille Davis filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in Ohio after
accumulating over $200,000 in debt.1 Davis’ chapter 13 petition allowed her to
satisfy her unsecured debts—totaling around $189,000—by agreeing to pay all
of her disposable income to her unsecured creditors over a five-year period.2
Davis committed to a plan that would pay her creditors $19,380, approximately
ten percent of the $189,000 of her accrued debt.3 Of Davis’s $5,627 in gross
monthly income, she designated $323 as disposable income available to her
creditors.4 In making her calculation, Davis set aside $220 of her gross monthly
income to contribute to her 401(k) plan.5
Under the view of most courts,6 allowing Davis to shield an additional forty
percent of the amount she could have paid her creditors, is acceptable.7 While
Davis gets quite the windfall, her creditors are left with only ten cents for every
dollar they are owed.8 Considering the stakes, this windfall is exactly the kind
of abuse that the Bankruptcy Code ought to prevent. Yet the treatment of post-

1

Davis v. Helbling (In re Davis), 960 F.3d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See In re Gibson, 2009 LEXIS 2524, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Aug. 31, 2009); In re Mati, 390 B.R. 11,
15–17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849, 864–65 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007); In re Leahy, 370
B.R. 620, 623–24 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007); In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 864–66 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re
Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670, 676 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. 689, 690–91 (Bankr. D. N.H.
2006).
7
Had the court determined that the post-petition 401(k) contributions were disposable income, Davis’
creditors would have received $32,580 of the $189,000 in accrued debt—totaling approximately seventeen cents
for every dollar owed. Davis, 960 F.3d at 346.
8
Id. at 364–65 (Readler, J., dissenting). The dissent argued the majority opinion allowed debtors to
shield forty percent of the amount to be paid to creditors and further stated:
2

[t]hat is not to say [the debtor] could never save for retirement, even in a post-petition [c]hapter
13 repayment setting. Were her monthly living expenses to fall below the over $5,000 budgeted
for those expenses, she could invest the difference in a 401(k) or another forward-looking
investment device. But at least for a three-to-five-year period, Congress curbed [the debtor] from
having her cake (over $5,000 for monthly living expenses) and eating it too (contributing $220
to a 401(k) over and above her monthly living expenses).
Id. (Readler, J., dissenting).
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petition 401(k) contributions in chapter 13 bankruptcy remains unpredictable
and confusing.9
This Comment argues that the majority approach which permits the
exclusion of voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions from disposable
income in chapter 13 cases unfairly incentivizes debtors to prioritize their
retirement needs and benefit their own future financial standing, rather than
repaying the creditors of their accrued debts. In 2017, the number of individuals
who filed a chapter 13 petition almost reached the number of civil and criminal
cases filed in federal district courts that same year.10 The Internal Revenue Code
provides some clarity as to whether voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions
constitute disposable income.11 Despite intersecting with the Internal Revenue
Code at times, the Bankruptcy Code’s language regarding the issue remains
unclear.12
Individual debtors seeking relief may file under chapter 7 or chapter 13,
depending on their financial circumstances. Because chapter 7 and chapter 13
differ in their processes, implications, and obligations, debtors must weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of these two avenues before filing for bankruptcy
relief. For example, the chapter 7 process liquidates the debtor’s property to
repay creditors. On the other hand, when filing under chapter 13, the debtor
retains their assets and proposes a plan to the court to repay their creditors using
her future earned income.13
For the court to approve a debtor’s chapter 13 plan proposal, “all of the
debtor’s projected disposable income” must be applied toward payments to
creditors.14 Section 1325(b)(2) excludes “amounts reasonably necessary . . . for
the maintenance or support of the debtor” from the debtor’s projected amount of
disposable income.15 Before Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention

9
See, e.g., In re Egan, 458 B.R. 836, 843–44 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (listing various approaches); In re
McCullers, 451 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011) (same).
10
In 2017, the total number of business and nonbusiness chapter 13 cases was 294,637. U.S. CTS., Table
F-2: Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month
Period Ending December 31, 2017 1, 1 (2018) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_
tables/bf_f2_1231.2017.pdf). In 2017, 344,787 civil and criminal cases were filed in federal court. U.S. CTS.,
Statistics Div., Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2017 Annual Report
of the Director 1,1 (2018) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2017).
11
“[A]ttempt[s] to advise taxpayers that contributions to voluntary retirement plans are not a necessary
expense.” IRM § 5.15.1.28 (Aug. 29, 2018); see In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2006).
12
See In re Trejos, 352 B.R. 249, 253–54 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
13
11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2018).
14
Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
15
Id. § 1325(b)(2).
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and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),16 bankruptcy courts held
that post-petition contributions were part of a debtor’s disposable income and
were not eligible for exemption as a reasonably necessary expense for a debtor’s
maintenance.17
However, the addition of Section 541(b)(7) caused confusion among
bankruptcy courts and resulted in inconsistent treatment of post-petition
contributions.18 Section 541(b)(7) excludes amounts “withheld by an employer
from the wages of employees for payment as contributions” to a 401(k)
retirement plan from the property of the estate.19 The confusion is caused by a
provision included under Section 541(b)(7)(A)(i)(III), which reads “except that
such amount under this subparagraph shall not constitute disposable income as
defined in [S]ection 1325(b)(2).”20 Addressed in Davis v. Helbling (In re Davis),
this uncertainty concerns whether debtors like Davis should be permitted to
exclude 401(k) contributions from the disposable income available to creditors
based on the language of Sections 541(b)(7) and 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code.21 In attempting to resolve this issue, courts disagree on matters such as
statutory interpretation, policy objectives, and whether debtors should be
allowed to ease their repayment commitments while securing their future
retirement plans.
Part I of this Comment introduces the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and shows that Congress used BAPCPA to further its intent to curb abuse
of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II illustrates the effect of BAPCPA on the
treatment of post-petition 401(k) contributions and describes the different
judicial analytical frameworks that have emerged as a result. Part III explains
how shielding 401(k) contributions from creditors invites abuse and gives Code

16

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23

(2005).
17
See In re Johnson, 241 B.R. 394, 399 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999); In re Austin, 299 B.R. 482, 486–87
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003); In re Keating, 298 B.R. 104, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Regan, 269 B.R.
693, 697 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re Merrill, 255 B.R. 320, 323–24 (Bankr. D. Or. 2000); In re Cox, 249
B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000); In re Cohen, 246 B.R. 658, 666–67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000); In re Hansen,
244 B.R. 799, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Anes v. Dehart (In re Anes), 195 F.3d 177, 180–81 (3d Cir.
1999); Harshbarger v. Pees (In re Harshbarger), 66 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1995).
18
Compare Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), with In re Prigge,
441 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010), and Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 663 (6th Cir.
2012).
19
11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7)(A).
20
Id.
21
Davis v. Helbling (In re Davis), 960 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§§ 541(b)(7)(A)(i)(I), 1325(b)(2)).
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support the conclusion that post-petition 401(k) contributions should be included
in a debtor’s disposable income.
I.

DISPOSABLE INCOME DEFINED—AN OVERVIEW OF §§ 1325(B) AND
541(B)(7)

The crux of the issue of whether a debtor may deduct voluntary post-petition
401(k) contributions from a chapter 13 plan lies in the language of Section
541(b)(7)22 when read with the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “disposable
income” in Section 1325(b)(2).23 The proper assessment of disposable income
is a crucial determination in all consumer bankruptcy proceedings because the
court will not confirm a debtor’s proposed chapter 13 plan without a
commitment of “all of the debtor’s projected disposable income” to repay
creditors.24 Therefore, having a firm understanding of how to calculate
disposable income is imperative for, not only chapter 13 debtors, but also
trustees and bankruptcy judges.
BAPCPA modified the method used by bankruptcy courts when determining
disposable income, particularly for debtors with above-median incomes.25
Under BAPCPA, above-median debtors must weather the “means test” under
Section 707(b)(2).26 Before confirming a plan, courts use the chapter 7 means
test to assess whether specific deducted expenses constitute abuse.27 Section
707(b)(2) makes no mention of post-petition retirement contributions. However,
BAPCPA’s addition of Section 541(b)(7) to the Bankruptcy Code—which
mentions post-petition retirement contributions—provides little clarity on the
issue of withholding 401(k) contribution from a debtor’s disposable income.28

22
Section 541(b)(7) provides that “[p]roperty of the estate does not include . . . any amount withheld by
an employer from the wages of employees for payment as contributions to [a 401(k)-retirement plan] . . . except
that such amount under this subparagraph shall not constitute disposable income as defined in section
1325(b)(2).” 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7).
23
“Disposable Income” includes the “current monthly income received by the debtor . . . less amounts
reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor.” Id. § 1325(b)(2) (2018).
24
Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
25
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33–34 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2005)). The language of
Section 1325(b)(2) still applies to chapter 13 debtors with below-median income. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2018);
see U.S. CTS., Instructions for the Chapter 13 Statement of Your Current Monthly Income, Calculation of
Commitment Period and Chapter 13 Calculation of Your Disposable Income, Official Forms 22C–1 and 22C–
2 (2014) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/b_22c-1_instructions.pdf).
26
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
27
Id. § 707(b)(2).
28
Id. § 541(b)(7)(A)(i)(I).
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Part I contextualizes these Bankruptcy Code sections within BAPCPA to
provide a basis for determining whether voluntary post-petition 401(k)
contributions are disposable income in a chapter 13 plan. Part I.A describes the
language of Section 1325(b)(2) and the treatment of post-petition 401(k)
contributions pre-BAPCPA. Part I.B addresses the legislative history of
BAPCPA and the means test under Section 707(b)(2). Part I.C analyzes
discrepancies between Sections 1325(b)(2) and 541(b)(7). Part I.D explores the
mechanics of the 401(k)-employer contribution plan. Finally, Part I.E examines
the intersection between the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Standards and the
Bankruptcy Code.
A. The Language of 11 U.S.C. Section 1325(b)(2)
Chapter 13 allows individual debtors to retain their property instead of
liquidating their assets to satisfy debts.29 Debtors must propose a plan using their
future income to repay creditors.30 Under the plan, if confirmed, all of an
individual debtor’s disposable income will be paid to unsecured creditors.31 The
judge determines the plan’s feasibility at a confirmation hearing and looks to
ensure that the plan adheres to statutory requirements.32 Creditors have the right
to object to provisions of the debtor’s plan.33 Following plan approval, a debtor’s
disposable income is distributed to his creditors by the trustee.34 A debtor’s
“disposable income” is defined under Section 1325(b)(2) as the “current
monthly income received by the debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary
to be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor.”35 For debtors
with income greater than the median, Section 1325(b)(3) states that the “amounts

29
A chapter 7 bankruptcy involves liquidating the assets of an individual debtor and using the proceeds
from the liquidation for creditor repayment. DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 34.10 at 4 (Theodore Eisenberg ed.,
2017). The chapter 13 process is more akin to a chapter 11 reorganization. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1300.01
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2021).
30
11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1325(b)(1)(B) (2018).
31
If the trustee objects to the debtor’s plan proposal, under Section 1325(b)(1), a bankruptcy plan cannot
be approved unless “the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the
applicable commitment period . . . will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors.’” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b)(1)(B) (2018); see Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 508 (2010).
32
U.S. CTS., Chapter 13 - Bankruptcy Basics, (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics) (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
33
Id.
34
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2018); U.S. CTS., Chapter 13 - Bankruptcy Basics, (available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2020); see Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 509.
35
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
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reasonably necessary to be expended”36 are “specified under the National
Standards and Local Standards . . . issued by the Internal Revenue Service.”37
While the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “projected disposable
income,” the Supreme Court clarified the language of Section 1325(b)(1) in
Hamilton v. Lanning.38 The Supreme Court held that “when a bankruptcy court
calculates a debtor’s projected disposable income, the court may account for
changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain
at the time of confirmation.”39 Therefore, calculating a debtor’s “projected
disposable income” is a two-step inquiry.40 First, the court applies the formula
set forth in Section 1325(b)(2) to calculate the debtor’s disposable income;
second, the court factors in adjustments for known or virtually known changes
in the debtor’s income.41
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added
Section 1325(b) to the Bankruptcy Code.42 The most significant revision of
Section 1325 was the requirement that for court confirmation, a debtor must pay
all of their disposable income from the applicable commitment period to the
plan.43 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary sought to address the “vague and
uncertain standards” of Section 1325 because “it [was] necessary to have a
definite standard delineating how much of the debtor’s future income should be
committed to the plan.”44 However, Congress declined the opportunity to
establish such a standard, and instead contended that “[t]he courts may be
expected to determine norms” for the maintenance of a debtor and his family.45
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged that chapter 13 relief
“may require some sacrifices by the debtor, and some alteration in prepetition
consumption levels.”46 The Committee first prioritized “the debtor’s obligations

36

Id. § 1325(b)(3) (2018).
Id. § 707(b)(2) (2018).
38
Hamilton, 560 U.S. at 524.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 519.
42
See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317(3), 98
Stat. 333, 356 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)).
43
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(B) (2018). Pre-BAPCPA, disposable income only had to be allocated to the
plan in general, whereas post-BAPCPA, the plan’s disposable income must be solely allocated to unsecured
creditors. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, 7 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 151:22 (3d ed.
2008).
44
S. REP. NO. 98–65, at 21 (1983).
45
Id. at 22.
46
Id.
37
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to support himself and his family” when calculating the amount of disposable
income for plan contribution.47 The Committee also emphasized the need for a
debtor to attempt to repay their debts to the best of their abilities, and that the
“repayment of debt should take precedence over expenses for non-necessary or
luxury items.”48 Although Congress gave deference to the courts to determine a
definite standard, such a standard never materialized.49 Instead, using some of
Section 1325(b)’s legislative history, courts decided whether post-petition
retirement contributions were reasonably necessary on a case-by-case basis.50
B. BAPCPA: Its Legislative History and the Means Test under § 707(b)(2)
Congress enacted BAPCPA as a response to concerns that consumer debtors
were abusing the Bankruptcy Code to discharge debts under chapter 7 they could
have paid under chapter 13.51 After BAPCA came into effect, qualifying for
chapter 7 relief became more difficult for debtors.52 BAPCPA encourages
debtors to enter into a chapter 13 reorganization—where debts are repaid out of
future income over a period of three to five years—rather than a chapter 7
liquidation, where debts are repaid out of current assets.53 This goal was
reflected in Section 707(b)(2)’s creation of the means test, which equipped
bankruptcy courts with the ability to dismiss a chapter 7 case if the court
determined the debtor’s income was higher than a statutorily allowed amount.54
Chapter 7 allows individual debtors to repay their creditors with proceeds
generated from the liquidation of their surrendered, nonexempt property.55
Chapter 7 releases the debtor from their debt obligations and does not require
debtors to satisfy any remaining debts with future income. There were over
47
48

Id. at 21.
Id. (citing Transamerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Stollenwerck (In re Stollenwerck), 8 B.R. 297 (M.D. Ala.

1981)).
49
See, e.g., In re Guild, 269 B.R. 470, 473–74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (declining to adopt a per se rule
excluding retirement loan repayments from disposable income because of the inherent unfairness).
50
E.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 65 (2011) (“[T]he pre-BAPCPA practice of
calculating debtors’ reasonable expenses on a case-by-case basis . . . led to varying and often inconsistent
determinations.”).
51
See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90–91; see also
Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 27 (2005) (statement of Sen.
John Cornyn).
52
See Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Filings, BANKRUPTCY
BY THE NUMBERS (July 1, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ust/articles/docs/2008/abi_200808.pdf.
53
ELIZABETH WARREN, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 253 (7th ed. 2014).
54
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (2018).
55
Property eligible for exemption varies widely—examples include a debtor’s residence, jewelry,
professional tools, and one motor vehicle. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 3 NORTON
BANKR. L. & PRAC., app. § 56-C:2 (3d ed. 2008) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522).
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double the number of chapter 7 filings as there were chapter 13 filings from
September 2019 to September 2020.56 Debtors may prefer chapter 7 because
they do not have to use their future income to pay creditors and may have little
nonexempt property to be surrendered and liquidated.
Section 707(b) limited chapter 7 eligibility to “only those debtors truly in
need of relief, thereby helping to preserve the integrity of the process.”57 Section
707(b) provides that the court may dismiss a case filed by an individual
consumer debtor if the court finds that granting a discharge would be an abuse
of the Bankruptcy Code.58 However, the Bankruptcy Code fails to define
“abuse,” leaving the courts to interpret the definition.
The means test provides that abuse exists if the debtor’s monthly income
multiplied by sixty is more than: (1) a quarter of the debtor’s “nonpriority
unsecured claims” or $8,175, whichever is greater, or (2) $13,650.59 A debtor
may reduce their monthly income by “monthly expense amounts specified under
the National Standards and Local Standards” and the debtor’s “Other Necessary
Expenses issued by the [IRS].”60 Debtors may also reduce reasonably necessary
monthly expenses for the care and support of chronically ill, disabled, or elderly
household members,61 actual chapter 13 plan administrative expenses,62 and
public or private school expenses for each dependent child.63
The amended language of Section 707(b)(3)’s totality of the circumstances
test reflects Congress’s goal of curbing abuse in chapter 7. The pre-BAPCPA
language requiring the demonstration of substantial abuse was lowered to a mere
showing of abuse.64 The provision establishing a “presumption in favor of

56
Between September of 2019 and September of 2020, there were 396,424 nonbusiness chapter 7 filings
and 193,095 nonbusiness chapter 13 filings. U.S. CTS., Table F-2: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and
Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2020, 1, 1 (2020) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bf_f2_0930.2020.
pdf).
57
In re Glenn, 345 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).
58
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2018). The Bankruptcy Code defines “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an
individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.” Id. § 101(8).
59
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
60
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). These monthly expenses include “reasonably necessary health insurance,
disability insurance, and health savings account expenses.” Id.
61
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
62
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III).
63
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).
64
See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 12 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 98; see also In re
Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849, 856 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
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granting the relief requested by the debtor,” under Section 707(b) was also
removed.65
While Congress primarily intended for the means test to deter chapter 7
abuse by individual debtors capable of repayment, its determinations are also
relevant in the chapter 13 context.66 The means test calculates the amount of
disposable income for above-median income debtors.67 A debtor is subject to the
means test if their current monthly income exceeds the median family income in
the debtor’s state of residence.68 The method of calculating disposable income
in Section 1325(b)(2) remains unchanged for below-median debtors.69
C. The “Hanging Paragraph” of § 541(b)(7) Applied to § 1325(b)(2)
Under Section 541(a)(1), “property of the bankruptcy estate consists of all
legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case, subject to certain exceptions, namely those found in subsection[s]
(b) and (c)(2).”70 Section 541(b)(7) provides:
(b) Property of the estate does not include—
....
(7) any amount—
(A) withheld by an employer from the wages of employees for
payment as contributions—
(i) to—
(I) an employee benefit plan that is subject to title I of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 or under an employee benefit plan which is a
governmental plan under section 414(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(II) a deferred compensation plan under section 457 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

65
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2004). Before BAPCPA’s 2005 enactment, Section 707(b) stated that “the court
. . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under [chapter 7] . . . if it finds that the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting
the relief requested by the debtor.” Id. However, Section 707(b)(1) now provides that “the court . . . may dismiss
a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter . . . if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse
of the provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 707(b)(1) (2018).
66
See 151 CONG. REC. S3036–37 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
67
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2018).
68
See Id.; 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 3075 (2021).
69
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2018); see also Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New
§ 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 237 (2005).
70
Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 667 (6th Cir. 2012); see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018).
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(III) a tax deferred annuity under section 403(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
except that such amount under this subparagraph shall
not constitute disposable income as defined in section 1325(b)(2).71

The interpretation of the emphasized portion, known as the “hanging
paragraph,”72 has been the source of “considerable disagreement among courts
and litigants nationwide.”73 Recently the Sixth Circuit noted that “BAPCPA’s
insertion of the hanging paragraph into Section 541(b)(7) has taken us from an
‘overwhelming consensus’ among bankruptcy courts, to four competing views
of whether voluntary retirement contributions constitute disposable income in a
[c]hapter 13 bankruptcy.”74
D. 401(k) Employer Contribution Plans
Many American workers use a 401(k), one of the most commonly used
methods of saving, in planning for their retirement.75 Vanguard defines a 401(k)
plan as a “defined contribution plan that allows employees to contribute pre-tax
dollars through salary deferral.”76 In a 401(k) plan, the contribution is taken out
of the paycheck before being taxed, which allows the participant to reduce their
taxable income.77 The 401(k) savings are taxed when they are removed from the
account, usually at retirement when the participant is likely in a lower-tax
bracket.78
Most 401(k) plan participants are given the option to invest their
contributions into “a variety of investment options—including stocks, bonds,

71

Id. § 541(b)(7)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672–73.
73
Davis v. Helbling (In re Davis), 960 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2020).
74
Id. at 351–53 (citation omitted).
75
Christine Benz, 100 Must-Know Statistics About 401(k) Plans, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 4, 2020), https://
www.morningstar.com/articles/1000743/100-must-know-statistics-about-401k-plans. Congress added Section
401(k) to the Internal Revenue Code through its enactment of the Revenue Act of 1978. Colleen E. Medill, Stock
Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 475 n.22 (2001).
76
401(k) Plan, VANGUARD: GLOSSARY FIN. TERMS, https://retirementplans.vanguard.com/VGApp/pe/
Glossary?Term=Glossary401plan (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
77
Before-Tax Contributions, VANGUARD: GLOSSARY FIN. TERMS, https://retirementplans.vanguard.com/
VGApp/pe/Glossary?Term=beforetaxcontributions (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
78
A participant may withdraw money before retirement, but the distribution is usually subject to an earlywithdrawal penalty. See Withdrawal, VANGUARD: GLOSSARY FIN. TERMS, https://retirementplans.vanguard.
com/VGApp/pe/Glossary?Term=withdrawal (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
72
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short-term reserves, mutual funds, and company stock.”79 Often, an employer
will match a percentage of an employee’s contribution up to a set amount.80
E. The IRS Standards
Some sections of the Bankruptcy Code reference the standards promulgated
by the Internal Revenue Service.81 The means test provides several different
types of expenses that a debtor may use to offset, and effectively reduce, their
monthly income.82 Additionally, the means test also states that the debtor’s
monthly expenses are the “amounts specified under the National Standards and
Local Standards, and . . . Other Necessary Expenses issued by the [IRS] for the
area in which the debtor resides.”83 The categories specified in the IRS National
Standards are Food, Clothing and Other Items (“FCOI”) and Out of Pocket
Health Care Expenses.84
The FCOI category accounts for allowable “reasonable amounts” for the
following types of expenses: apparel and services, food, housekeeping supplies,
personal care products and services, and miscellaneous expenses.85 The only
other relevant expense within the FCOI category is the “miscellaneous” expense,
which the IRS defines as “a percentage of the other categories . . . based on
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.”86 The Local Standards provided by the
IRS also fail to address post-petition 401(k) contributions.87
The Other Necessary Expenses category of the IRS Standards states that,
“[o]ther expenses may be necessary or conditional. Other necessary expenses
meet the necessary expense test and normally are allowed. The amount allowed
must be reasonable considering the taxpayer’s individual facts and

79
Supra note 76. As of 2017, the average number of investment choices for a 401(k) plan is twenty-eight.
Benz, supra note 75.
80
As of 2017: (1) fifty-eight percent of 401(k) plans with less than $1 million in assets offered matching
employer contributions; (2) seventy-eight percent of 401(k) plans with less than $10 million in assets offered
matching employer contributions; (3) and ninety-eight percent of 401(k) plans with more than $100 million in
assets offered matching employer contributions. Benz, supra note 75.
81
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2018).
82
Id.
83
Id. (emphasis added).
84
The “Out of Pocket Health Care Expenses” category does not address the issue of post-petition 401(k)
contributions. IRM §§ 5.15.1.9(1), (5) (Aug. 29, 2018). However, this category does explicitly include: (1)
prescription drugs; (2) medical supplies, and (3) medical services. IRM § 5.15.1.9(5)(a)–(c) (Aug. 29, 2018).
85
Id. § 5.15.1.9(1)(a)–(e) (Aug. 29, 2018).
86
Id. § 5.15.1.9(1)(e) (Aug. 29, 2018).
87
The Local Standards only include “Housing and Utilities” and “Transportation.” Id. § 5.15.1.10
(July 24, 2019).
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circumstances.”88 To pass the necessary expense test, an expense must “provide
for a taxpayer’s and his or her family’s health and welfare and/or production of
income.”89 The only relevant example provided under the Other Necessary
Expenses category is “Involuntary Deductions,” which may qualify as a
necessary expense if the deductions are “a requirement of the job[,] e.g., union
dues, uniforms, work shoes.”90
All individual debtors pursuing chapter 7 relief must file a statement of
current monthly income on Official Bankruptcy Form 122A-1 (the “Monthly
Income Form”).91 The debtor must prepare the chapter 7 means test calculation
on Official Form 122A-2 (the “Means Test Form”)92 if the Monthly Income
Form indicates that the debtor earns an above-median income. 93 The first part
of the Means Test Form computes the debtor’s adjusted income,94 while the
second part calculates the debtor’s possible deductions.95
Part two of the Means Test Form specifically instructs filers that “[t]he [IRS]
issues National and Local Standards for certain expense amounts.”96 Line 17 of
part two provides: “Involuntary deductions: The total monthly payroll
deductions that your job requires, such as retirement contributions, union dues,
and uniform costs. Do not include amounts that are not required by your job,
such as voluntary 401(k) contributions or payroll savings.”97 Similarly, Official
Form 122C-2 (the “Disposable Income Form”) instructs chapter 13 debtors to
“not include amounts that are not required by your job, such as voluntary 401(k)

88

Id. § 5.15.1.11(1) (Aug. 29, 2018).
Id. § 5.15.1.8(1) (July 24, 2019).
90
Id. § 5.15.1.11(3) (Aug. 29, 2018); see In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 657 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding
a presumption of abuse where the debtor unsuccessfully argued that he could deduct 401(k) loan repayments
from his disposable income because they were a requirement of his job under the Other Expenses Category in
the Internal Revenue Manual).
91
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b)(4) requires the filing of “a statement of current monthly
income prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4).
92
U.S. CTS., Official Form 122A-2: Chapter 7 Means Test Calculations (2019) (available at https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_122a-2.pdf).
93
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4) (stating “if the current monthly income exceeds the median family
income for the applicable state and household size, [an individual debtor in a chapter 7 case shall file] the
information, including calculations, required by § 707(b), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official
Form”).
94
U.S. CTS., supra note 92 at 1.
95
Id. at 2–8.
96
Id. at 2.
97
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
89

HOWELL_2.1.22

2022]

2/24/2022 1:54 PM

HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO

159

contributions or payroll savings” as involuntary deductions from the Other
Necessary Expenses IRS category.98
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND THE EVOLVING CLASSIFICATION OF
VOLUNTARY POST-PETITION 401(K) CONTRIBUTIONS IN CHAPTER 13 CASES
Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, courts determined what expenses are reasonably necessary for the
maintenance or support of a debtor on a case-by-case basis.99 Following
BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts have employed various tools of statutory
interpretation to determine whether post-petition 401(k) contributions constitute
disposable income in a chapter 13 plan; while most courts hold that all postpetition 401(k) contributions are excluded from disposable income available to
creditors, some courts still disagree on the extent that post-petition 401(k)
contributions are reasonably necessary in the context of Section 541(b)(7).100
Part II.A examines the pre-BAPCPA majority view that post-filing 401(k)
contributions do not receive protection from creditors. Part II.B examines the
three distinct approaches in interpreting Section 541(b)(7) that courts developed
after the enactment of BAPCPA. Specifically, Part II.B analyzes the tools of
statutory interpretation and policy rationales used by different jurisdictions to
determine if post-petition 401(k) contributions can be shielded from creditors.
A. Patterson, Hebbring, and Other Pre-BAPCPA Decisions
The Supreme Court addressed the treatment of pre-petition 401(k) savings
in relation to the bankruptcy estate before BAPCPA. In Patterson v. Shumate,
the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code excluded a debtor’s prepetition 401(k) savings from property of the estate in chapter 13 cases.101 While
the Supreme Court did not address the treatment of post-petition 401(k), there
was a consensus among the federal courts as to the treatment of such
contributions: voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions were not reasonably
necessary for the maintenance or support of a debtor, and therefore constituted
98
U.S. CTS., Official Form 122C-2: Ch. 13 Calculation of Your Disposable Income, 1, 4 (2019) (available
at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_122c-2.pdf). All individual debtors seeking chapter 13
relief must file a calculation of disposable income on Official Form 122C-2. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(6).
99
See e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Sapir (In re Taylor), 243 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Guild,
269 B.R. 470, 473–74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); In re King, 308 B.R. 522, 530–31 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004).
100
Compare Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), with In re Prigge,
441 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010), and Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 663 (6th Cir.
2012).
101
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760–64 (1992).
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disposable income.102 Some courts declined to follow this majority view, and
instead adopted a case-by-case approach for determining the treatment of postpetition 401(k) contributions.103 This section examines the Supreme Court’s
decision addressing pre-petition 401(k) savings, along with the Second and
Fourth Circuit’s decisions addressing post-petition 401(k) contributions.
1. Patterson and Pre-Petition 401(k) Contributions
In Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court considered “whether an
antialienation provision contained in an ERISA-qualified pension plan
constitutes a restriction on transfer enforceable under ‘applicable nonbankruptcy
law.’”104 In 1982, the Coleman Furniture Corporation filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy after suffering financial difficulties.105 Two years later, Joseph B.
Shumate, Jr., the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Coleman Furniture Corporation, also filed for relief.106 Coleman Furniture
Corporation’s and Shumate’s cases were both converted to chapter 7.107 At the
time of filing, around 400 employees, including Shumate, participated in the
Coleman Furniture Corporation Pension Plan, which “satisfied all applicable
requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.”108 The
pension plan provided an antialienation provision “required for qualification
under Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA.”109 The trustee for the corporation’s
bankruptcy filing “terminated and liquidated the [p]lan, providing full
distributions to all participants except Shumate.”110 In this case, the district court
faced the issue of whether to exclude Shumate’s pension plan from his

102
See In re Johnson, 241 B.R. 394, 399 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999); In re Austin, 299 B.R. 482, 486–87
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2003); In re Keating, 298 B.R. 104, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Regan, 269 B.R.
693, 697 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re Merrill, 255 B.R. 320, 323–24 (Bankr. D. Or. 2000); In re Cox, 249
B.R. 29, 32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000); In re Cohen, 246 B.R. 658, 666–67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000); In re Hansen,
244 B.R. 799, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
103
See Hebbring v. U.S. Tr., 463 F.3d 902, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2006); N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Sapir (In
re Taylor), 243 F.3d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2001); see also In re Guild, 269 B.R. 470, 473–74 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2001); In re King, 308 B.R. 522, 530–31 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004).
104
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 755 (1992).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. (“Each plan shall provide that benefits provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)).
110
Id.
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bankruptcy estate or, as a secondary option, exempt the plan under the
Bankruptcy Code’s exemption section.111
The district court held that the Bankruptcy Code’s “reference to
nonbankruptcy law embraced only state law, not federal law such as ERISA”
and, therefore, “Shumate’s interest in the [pension plan] did not qualify for
protection.”112 The case was reversed on appeal.113 The Fourth Circuit held that
“Shumate’s interest in the pension plan should be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under [Section] 541(c)(2)” because of the plan’s anti-alienation provision
required by ERISA.114 The court declined to address whether Shumate’s interest
qualified for exemption under the Bankruptcy Code’s exemptions section
because “where trusts contain enforceable restrictions on transfer of a beneficial
interest, those restrictions must be recognized in bankruptcy . . . to exclude the
interest from the debtor’s estate.”115
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that “a debtor may exclude
interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan from the bankruptcy estate.”116 The
Court found the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy
Code persuasive and agreed that “[n]othing in [Section] 541 suggests that the
phrase ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law’ refers . . . exclusively to state law.”117
The Court also emphasized that “[r]eading the term ‘applicable nonbankruptcy
law’ in [Section] 541(c)(2) to include federal as well as state law comports with
other references in the Bankruptcy Code to sources of law.”118 Specifically, the
Court found that other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were indicative of
Congress’s cognizant ability to “restrict the scope of applicable law to ‘state
law.’”119 Accordingly, the Court concluded that “Congress’ decision to use the
111
Shumate argued that his pension plan was “exempt under Federal law” from the bankruptcy estate
under Section 522(b)(2)(A) because ERISA and the IRC required that his pension plan contain an antiassignment clause. Section 522(b)(2)(A), in relevant part, provides that “an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate . . . [a]ny property that is exempt under Federal law.” Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp.
83 B.R. 404, 405 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)).
112
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 756 (1992) (internal marks omitted); 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2018).
113
Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 362 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Patterson v. Shumate,
112 S. Ct. 932, aff’d, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
114
Id. at 365.
115
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541 (2018).
116
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755. “The antialienation provision required for ERISA qualification and
contained in the Plan at issue in this case thus constitutes an enforceable transfer restriction for purposes of
§ 541(c)(2)’s exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate.” Id. at 760.
117
Id. at 758.
118
Id.
119
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018) (providing that an entity may be a debtor
under chapter 9 if authorized “by State law”); id. § 622(b)(2) (2018) (election of exemptions controlled by “the
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broader phrase ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law’ in Section 541(c)(2) strongly
suggests that it did not intend to restrict the provision” to only state law.120
2. The Second Circuit Case-By-Case Test
In New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. Sapir (In re Taylor), an
appeal for the treatment of a debtor’s employer-mandated pension contributions
under Section 1325(b) was at issue before the Second Circuit.121 Taylor—a city
employee—filed for chapter 13 relief in 1998.122 Her employment required that
she automatically contribute to a multi-employer benefit plan from her salary.123
The bankruptcy court held that “pension withholdings from a [c]hapter 13
debtor’s salary are disposable income and thus must be included in the Plan to
pay outstanding debts and obtain discharge” based on prior precedent.124 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision because the required
payroll deductions “may not be allowed to interfere with the creditors’
entitlement to receive all of the debtor’s disposable income under Section
1325(b)(1)(B).”125
The Second Circuit declined to adopt a strict rule, and instead outlined a
series of factors to consult when confronted with the issue of whether employee
pension contributions constitute disposable income.126 The factors include:
State law that is applicable to the debtor”); id. § 523(a)(15) (2018) (a debt for alimony, maintenance, or support
determined “in accordance with State or territorial law” is not dischargeable); id. § 903(1) (2018) (“a State law
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness” of municipalities is not binding on nonconsenting
creditors); see also id. §§ 362(b)(12),1145(a) (2018).
120
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758.
121
N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Sapir (In re Taylor), 243 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2001).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 126–27.
Pursuant to the Trustee’s objection to the [p]lan, [d]ebtor filed a motion in bankruptcy court
requesting an order that [her employers] “cease payroll deduction for pension contribution for
the duration of the [bankruptcy] plan.” [debtor’s employers] objected to [d]ebtor’s motion on the
ground that pension contributions are mandated by state statutes that require that certain public
employees participate as members of [the employer] and that members contribute to the fund.
Because membership and contributions are mandated by state statute, [debtor’s employer] argued
that the pension contributions are a reasonably necessary expense and, therefore, cannot be
included as disposable income in the [p]lan.
Id. at 126–27 (fourth alteration in original).
124
Id. at 127.
125
Id. at 126–27 (internal marks and citation omitted).
126
Id. at 129–30. The court analyzed two cases with similar facts to the case at issue that reached opposite
conclusions. In In re Nation, the bankruptcy court held that “pension contributions, though required by state
statute, are not truly mandatory and, therefore, must count as disposable income.” Id. at 128 (citing In re Nation,
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(1) the age of the debtor and the amount of time until expected
retirement; (2) the amount of the monthly contributions and the total
amount of pension contributions debtor will have to buy back if the
payments are discontinued; (3) the likelihood that buy-back payments
will jeopardize the debtor’s fresh start; (4) the number and nature of
the debtor’s dependents [sic]; (5) evidence that the debtor will suffer
adverse employment conditions if the contributions are ceased; (6) the
debtor’s yearly income; (7) the debtor’s overall budget; (8) who moved
for an order to discontinue payments; and (9) any other constraints on
the debtor that make it likely that the pension contributions are
reasonably necessary expenses for that debtor.127

Before BAPCPA, many bankruptcy courts agreed with the reasoning set
forth by the court in In re Taylor.128 For example, in In re Guild, the court
concluded that “the facts surrounding each individual case must be analyzed in
order to make a fair determination as to whether the money being utilized for
loan repayment is reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support of a
debtor.”129 The court acknowledged that “debtors cannot live by bread alone,”130
and that interpreting reasonably necessary requires finding “a balance between
debtors being required to adopt a totally spartan existence and allowing them to
‘continue an extravagant lifestyle at the expense of creditors.’”131

236 B.R. 150, 154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Basing their decision on the doctrine of preemption, the court
reasoned “that the mandatory state law conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, the Code preempts
the state law.” Id. (“National policy codified in a statute of Congress such as the Bankruptcy Code must be given
primacy over local enactments and private contracts.”) (citing Nation, 236 B.R. at 154). However, in In re Davis,
the court “reject[ed] Nation’s use of the doctrine of preemption . . . [and] noted that it had no reason to apply the
doctrine because the state statute, read with the above definition of reasonably necessary, did not actually conflict
with the Code.” Id. at 129 (Finding “no evidence of congressional intent to preempt” and concluding that that
“because the debtor’s job was obviously reasonably necessary to his maintenance and support, the deductions
were therefore reasonably necessary and could not be included as disposable income.”) (citing In re Davis, 241
B.R. 704, 708–09 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (1999)).
127
Id. at 129–30.
128
See, e.g., In re Guild, 269 B.R. 470, 474 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); In re King, 308 B.R. 522, 530–31
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2004).
129
In re Guild, 269 B.R. at 474 (internal marks omitted). “There is an inherent unfairness in adopting a
per se rule that says retirement loan repayments are never reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support
of a debtor and thus should always be considered disposable income.” Id.
130
Id. at 472.
131
Id. (internal marks and citation omitted). “Therefore, a court must factor into its analysis essential
expenditures, ‘such as reasonable amounts budgeted for food, clothing and shelter’ as well as ‘discretionary
spending for items such as recreation, clubs, entertainment, newspapers, charitable contributions and other
expenses.’” Id. (quoting In re Beckel, 268 B.R. 179, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001).
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3. The Hebbring Test
In Hebbring v. U.S. Trustee, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “case-by-case
approach, under which contributions to a retirement plan may be found
reasonably necessary depending on the debtor’s circumstances.”132 Declining to
define “reasonably necessary,” the court reasoned that “the Code suggests courts
should examine each debtor’s specific circumstances to determine whether a
claimed expense is reasonably necessary for that debtor’s maintenance or
support.”133 According to the court, a case-by-case approach “better comports
with Congress’s intent, as expressed in the language, purpose, and structure of
the Bankruptcy Code.”134
The Hebbring test suggests that courts apply the In re Taylor135 factors
originally used for employee pension plans, to determine whether post-petition
retirement contributions are a reasonably necessary expense.136 If a debtor’s
proposed retirement savings “appear reasonably necessary for the maintenance
or support of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents,” then a court must approve
the debtor’s proposed plan.137 Also, the Hebbring court highlighted the idea that:
“[t]he case-by-case approach . . . should be no more difficult to apply to
retirement contributions than to other forward-looking expenses that bankruptcy
courts must evaluate for reasonableness.”138 To illustrate this concept, the court
compared the reasonableness of post-petition contributions by an older debtor
nearing retirement, with the unreasonableness of post-petition contributions by
a married couple in their early thirties.139

132

Hebbring v. U.S. Tr., 463 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
134
Id.
135
N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Sapir (In re Taylor), 243 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001).
136
Hebbring, 463 F.3d at 907 (citing N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 243 F.3d at 129–30).
137
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)).
138
Id. at 908. The court listed “life insurance premiums, private school tuition for debtors’ children, [and]
home maintenance costs” as examples of other forward-looking expenses that arise in bankruptcy courts. Id.
(internal citation omitted).
139
See id. The court compared In re Osborne, where “401(k) contributions of less than 2% of debtors’
$71,280 annual gross income were not a reasonably necessary expense for a married couple in their early thirties”
with In re Mills, where the “401(k) contributions of 10% of debtor’s $36,228 annual gross income were a
reasonably necessary expense for a fifty-six-year-old debtor with total retirement savings of $9,000.” Id.
(comparing In re Osborne, No. 02-24999-HRT, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 326 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 8, 2003), with
In re Mills, 246 B.R. 395, 399, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000).
133
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B. Johnson, Prigge, and Seafort: Post-BAPCPA Decisions
An important change made by BAPCPA was Congress’s protection of prepetition 401(k) savings through the addition of Section 541(b)(7)(A). However,
Congress’s further addition of the hanging paragraph to Section 541(b)(7)
ultimately complicated the how courts evaluate post-petition 401(k)
contributions. Courts remain uncertain as to whether these contributions
constitute disposable income. This section examines the three major postBAPCPA decisions to date: (1) In re Johnson; (2) In re Prigge; and (3) In re
Seafort.
1. Johnson Approach
One year after Congress signed BAPCPA into law, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia addressed whether postpetition 401(k) contributions were disposable income under Section 541(b)(7)
in Baxter v. Johnson.140 The Johnsons filed for chapter 13 relief because their
combined income of $56,221 exceeded the applicable median income of
$51,545.141 Their repayment plan proposed a monthly payment of $303 to
creditors over a five-year commitment period.142 The trustee objected to the
proposed plan on the grounds that “the [d]ebtors’ actual incomes and actual
expenses . . . indicate that they are able to pay more to their unsecured
creditors,”143 while the debtors contended that Section 1325(b) “conclusively
determines the amount of disposable income available for creditors.”144
The bankruptcy court held that the Johnsons’ voluntary contributions to their
401(k) plans and their 401(k) loan repayments did not qualify as disposable
income.145 For 401(k) loan repayments, Section 1322(f) provides “a plan may
not materially alter the terms of a loan described in section 362(b)(19) [i.e., a
loan from a qualifying employee benefit plans or retirement savings accounts],
and any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute ‘disposable
income’ under section 1325.”146 The bankruptcy court reasoned that Section
541(b)(7) “plainly state[s] that these contributions ‘shall not constitute
disposable income’” under Section 1325(b)(2), subject only to the good faith
140

Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 259.
142
Id. at 260.
143
Id. at 261. The debtors proposed to repay a total of $18,180 while contributing $1,128.72 per month to
their 401(k) retirements account ($67,723.20 in total over the same five-year plan period). Id. at 263.
144
Id. at 261.
145
Id. at 263.
146
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f)) (alteration in original).
141
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requirement imposed by the Bankruptcy Code.147 Despite turning to the IRS
Standards to address the trustee’s other objections, the bankruptcy court ended
its post-petition 401(k) contribution and loan repayment inquiry after
exclusively using the plain meaning of the text.148
Section 1325(a)(3) requires that “the plan has been proposed in good faith
and not by any means forbidden by law” for court confirmation.149 The
bankruptcy court found that BAPCPA’s amendments to Section 1325(b) “alter
the good faith inquiry under § 1325(a)(3)” by “narrow[ing] the scope of judicial
discretion.”150 After discussing several types of income that “[d]ebtors [were]
not required to contribute . . . to their [c]hapter 13 plans,” the bankruptcy court
declined to incorporate those types of income under its Section 1325(a)(3) good
faith analysis.151 The bankruptcy court found that the Johnsons’ post-petition
401(k) loan repayments and voluntary contributions were in good faith and
noted that “[s]o long as a debtor’s contributions [were] within the limits legally
permitted by the [employee benefit plan], ‘any amount’ of this contribution
[was] exempted from disposable income.”152 The court concluded that
“Congress has placed retirement contributions outside the purview of a chapter
13 plan.”153
Using the court’s analytical framework in Johnson, some courts reason that
Section 541(b)(7) provides that retirement plan contributions do not constitute
disposable income for the purposes of Section 1325(b)(2).154 In re Devilliers,
the bankruptcy court found nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requiring that
retirement account contributions be “reasonable and necessary,” and reasoned

147

Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)

(2018).
148

Johnson, 346 B.R. at 263–68.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (emphasis added). “Although the Code does not explicitly define the term ‘good
faith,’ the inquiry into good faith is ‘broadly speaking . . . whether or not under the circumstances of the case
there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [chapter 13] in the [proposed plan].’” Johnson,
346 B.R. at 261 (quoting Kitchens v. Ga. R.R. Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 888 (11th Cir.
1983) (citation omitted)).
150
Johnson, 346 B.R. at 262. The court found that “BAPCPA recasts the totality-of-the-circumstances test
set forth in Kitchens” that the Eleventh Circuit provided to determine the good faith of a chapter 13 debtor. Id.
(citing Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 888–89).
151
Id. at 263.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849, 864–65 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007) (“As excluded income, the contributions
are not a deduction because they were never included in the first instance.”); see In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861,
864 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) (adopting the reasoning in Devilliers); In re Leahy, 370 B.R. 620, 625 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 2007) (same).
149
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that the absence of such language in Section 541(b)(7) was significant.155 In re
Egan, the court reached the same conclusion, explaining that the “language [of
Section 1306(a)(1)] makes clear that property of the type specified by [Section]
541 that is acquired post-petition by a chapter 13 debtor, and not just postpetition income, becomes part of that debtor’s chapter 13 estate.”156
2. Prigge Approach
Four years after Johnson, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Montana considered whether post-petition retirement account contributions
were a necessary expense under Section 541(b)(7).157 Prigge filed for chapter 13
relief because his $89,739.96 income exceeded the applicable median income
for the state of Montana and made him ineligible for chapter 7 relief.158 His
original plan proposed a monthly payment of $100 over the course of the fiveyear commitment period, and “the liquidation analysis stated $0.00 would be
distributed to unsecured claims.”159 The trustee objected to the proposed plan on
the grounds that “the plan was not filed in good faith” under [Section]1325(a)(3)
and “that the Debtor failed to satisfy the disposable income test of [Section]
1325(b).”160
Using the tools of statutory interpretation,161 the bankruptcy court noted that,
in drafting Section 1322(f), Congress specifically excluded amounts required to
repay loans taken out of retirement plans from disposable income, but ultimately
failed to draft any provision to specifically exclude voluntary 401(k) plan

155

Devilliers, 358 B.R. at 864–65.
[U]nlike the provisions of § 707(b)(2) and § 1325(b)(2) or (3), § 541(b)(7) does not modify
excluded contributions based on reasonableness or necessity. Throughout the other applicable
sections of the Code, every deduction offered is modified by a requirement that the expense be
“necessary and reasonable.” Yet, § 541(b)(7) omits any reference to this important limitation on
the exclusion.

Id.
156
In re Egan, 458 B.R. 836, 846 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing In re Willett, 544 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir.
2008)). “Section 1306(a)(1) incorporates into a chapter 13 estate ‘all property of the kind specified in [§ 541]
that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted.’” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. §1306(a)(1)).
157
In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 677 n.5 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010).
158
Id. at 669–70.
159
Id. at 671.
160
Id.
161
See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
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contributions.162 The bankruptcy court found that Congress’ failure to
specifically exclude 401(k) contributions within the Bankruptcy Code was
deliberate, and reasoned that “[i]f Congress had intended to exclude voluntary
401(k) contributions from disposable income it could have drafted [Section]
1322(f) to provide for such an exclusion, or provided one elsewhere.”163
The bankruptcy court relied on In re Egebjerg, which declined to include
voluntary retirement plan contributions as a necessary expense because
“[C]ongress provided, by reference to the IRS guidelines, specific guidance as
to what qualifies as a necessary expense.”164 In In re Egebjerg, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized “that the IRS guidelines themselves provide that contributions to
voluntary retirement plans are not a necessary expense.”165 However, the debtor
argued that “Egebjerg [was] inapplicable because it discusses 401(k) loan
repayments in a [c]hapter 7 case, not 401(k) contributions in a [c]hapter 13
case.”166 Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court noted that the debtor’s argument
“ignore[d] [Section] 1325(b)(3) which specifically requires that amounts
reasonably necessary ‘shall be determined’ under [Section] 707(b)(2).”167 The
bankruptcy court ultimately concluded that the purpose of Section 541(b)(7) was
to clarify that pre-petition retirement contributions still in the employer’s
possession at the time of filing were neither post-petition disposable income, nor
property of the estate.168
In In re Prigge, recent paystubs indicated that the debtor was making
monthly contributions of $343.09 to his 401(k) plan before filing for chapter
13.169 At the time of filing, the debtor’s 401(k) balance, from his employer of
twenty years, was $4,677.08.170 Assuming arguendo that the debtor was
permitted to exclude $1,181.08171 per month from his disposable income to be
repaid to his creditors over the course of five years, he would have prevented a

162

In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 677 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f).
Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677.
164
Id. at 676 (quoting Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)).
165
Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1052 (internal marks and citation omitted).
166
Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677.
167
Id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2), 1325(b)(3) (2006).
168
Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677 n.5 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541.22C[1] (15th ed. rev.) (stating
that Section 541(b)(7) “seems intended to protect amounts withheld by employers from employees that are in
the employer’s hands at the time of filing bankruptcy, prior to remission of the funds to the plan.”)).
169
Id. at 670–71.
170
Id. at 670. Had the debtor’s proposed plan of $1,181.08 monthly 401(k) contributions been confirmed,
his 401(k) balance would have grown over 1,500% over the five-year commitment period. Id. at 677.
171
This figure only accounts for the principal amount and fails to reflect the possibility of investment
returns had the debtor decided to invest the money and not leave it in cash. Id. at 670–71.
163
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total of $70,864.80 from being distributed to his unsecured creditors.172
However, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor failed to satisfy the
disposable income test and denied confirmation of the plan.173
3. Seafort Approach
In In re Seafort, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the income available
to a debtor after their 401(k) loans are fully repaid may be used for voluntary
401(k) contributions and excluded from disposable income under Section
541(b)(7).174 Before filing for chapter 13 relief in 2008, Seafort was eligible to
contribute to her employer’s 401(k) retirement plan but declined to do so.175
Seafort was, however, making $254.71 monthly payments to repay a 401(k)
loan.176 In Seafort’s proposed plan, she would pay off the 401(k) loan in full by
the nineteenth month, well in advance of the sixty-month commitment period.177
Once the 401(k) loan was fully repaid, Seafort proposed to voluntarily contribute
the $254.71 to her 401(k) for the remaining forty-one months of the plan.178 The
chapter 13 trustee objected to Seafort’s plans to contribute additional money to
her 401(k), rather than designating those funds as disposable income, because
she was “not contributing anything” to her 401(k) at the time of filing for chapter
13 relief.179
The Sixth Circuit held that once a debtor’s 401(k) loan repayments are fully
repaid, the newly available income “is properly committed to the debtor’s
respective [c]hapter 13 plans for distribution to the unsecured creditors and may
not be used to make voluntary retirement contributions.”180 Using statutory
interpretation, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “Congress’s placement of
401(k) loan repayments within [c]hapter 13 itself and placement of the exclusion
for voluntary retirement contributions elsewhere was deliberate.”181
172
The debtor claimed that his employer required a three percent withholding for his 401(k) contributions.
Had the debtor correctly filed his plan indicating such, “then that 3% would not be voluntary and prohibited
under Egebjerg.” Id. at 677. Accordingly, had the debtor been allowed to contribute the $1,145.64 on top of the
mandatory three percent, “[o]ver 60 months that amount would grow to $68,738.40 for distribution to unsecured
claims and administrative expenses.” Id.
173
Id. at 679.
174
Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 663 (6th Cir. 2012).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 664.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 674.
181
Id. at 672 (6th Cir. 2012); see Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“Where
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Accordingly, the court inferred that “Congress did not intend to treat voluntary
401(k) contributions like 401(k) loan repayments, because it did not similarly
exclude them from ‘disposable income’ within [c]hapter 13 itself.”182 However,
the court conceded that “§ 541(b)(7) must provide some sort of protection for
voluntary retirement contributions in chapter 13 cases, because it says that such
contributions ‘shall not constitute disposable income as defined in section
1325(b)(2).’”183
The court then turned to In re McCullers, where the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of California noted that the “structure suggest[ed] that
section 541(b)(7) exclude[d] from property of the estate only property that
would otherwise be included in the estate under section 541(a).”184 The Sixth
Circuit agreed with the McCullers court and concluded that “the most natural
reading of section 541(b)(7) [was] that it exclude[d] from property of the estate
only those contributions made before the petition date as indicated by its
specifying the contributions excluded from property of the estate and then
stating that such amount shall not constitute disposable income.”185 The Sixth
Circuit also agreed with the McCullers court’s conclusion that “the term ‘except
that’ in the hanging paragraph was designed simply to clarify that the voluntary
retirement contributions excluded from the property of the estate are not postpetition income to the debtor.”186
The court also found that the hanging paragraph of Section 541(b)(7)(A)
provided an important distinction “between qualified retirement plan
contributions in effect as of the commencement of a bankruptcy case and those

Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (quoting
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
182
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672. “[A]ny amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute ‘disposable
income’ under section 1325.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f)).
183
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7)).
184
Id. (quoting In re McCullers, 451 B.R. 498, 503–04 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011)).
185
Id. at 673 (internal marks omitted) (quoting In re McCullers, 451 B.R. at 503–04).
186
Id. (quoting In re McCullers, 451 B.R. at 504–05).
[Section 541(b)(7)] broadly excludes from “property of the estate” funds “withheld by an
employer from the wages of employees” as contributions to specified types of employee-benefit
plans, deferred compensation plans and tax-deferred annuity plans. It seems intended to protect
amounts withheld by employers from employees that are in the employer’s hands at the time of
filing bankruptcy, prior to remission of the funds to the plan.
In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 677 n.5 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010) (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541.22C[1]
(15th ed. rev.)).
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cases where contributions are not in effect as of commencement.”187 The court
found the phrase “under this subparagraph” to be particularly significant:
If all contributions to qualified retirement plans were excluded from
disposable income, regardless of whether they were in effect as of the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the phrase “under this
subparagraph” would be superfluous, and [Section] 541(b)(7) would
simply read “such amount [qualified retirement plan contributions]
shall not constitute disposable income as defined in section
1325(b)(2).” As it is written though, Congress intentionally limited the
type of contributions to qualified retirement plans that would be
excluded from disposable income, namely those “under this
subparagraph”, [Section] 541(b)(7)(A), which in turn governs only
those contributions in effect as of the commencement of a debtor’s
bankruptcy case, per [Section] 541(a)(1).188

According to the court, this explanation “gives effect to every word in the
statute”189 and aligns with the conclusion that “BAPCPA’s ‘core purpose’ is to
ensure that debtors devote their full disposable income to repaying creditors and
maximizing creditor recoveries.”190
a. In re Anh-Thu Thi Vu Approach
In the case of In re Anh-Thu Thi Vu, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Washington adopted a modified version of Seafort.191 Anh-Thu Thi
Vu, an above-median debtor, “voluntarily contributed an average of $877 per
month to her Thrift Savings Plan” during the six months before filing for chapter
13 relief.192 Her repayment plan proposed a monthly payment of $80 over the

187

Seafort, 669 F.3d at 673.
Id. (clarifying Section 541(b)(7)(A) in the context of Sections 541(a)(1) and 1325(b)(2)).
189
Id. at 673–74; see Penn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (“Our cases
express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the
same enactment.”); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988) (same).
190
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 674 (quoting Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.3d 327, 343, 356 (6th Cir. 2011)). The court
also states that “[t]he legislative history supports this reading too.” Id. (quoting Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.3d 327,
343, 356 (6th Cir. 2011)); see H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2–3 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
89 (“The heart of the bill’s consumer bankruptcy reforms consists of the implementation of an income/expense
screening mechanism (‘needs-based bankruptcy relief’ or ‘means testing’), which is intended to ensure that
debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.”); Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721
(2011) (stating that the Congress’s intent in drafting BAPCPA was “to correct perceived abuses of the
bankruptcy system” and create the “means test” of Section 707(b) “to help ensure that debtors who can pay
creditors do pay them.”).
191
In re Anh-Thu Thi Vu, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1967, at *9–10 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2015).
192
Id. at *1.
188
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course of the five-year commitment period.193 The trustee objected to the
debtor’s deduction of voluntary retirement contributions because “[o]ver the life
of the Plan, unsecured creditors will receive a total of $4,619, approximately
nine percent of Debtor’s $50,343 scheduled unsecured debt, while Debtor will
contribute over $50,000 to her [Thrift Savings Plan].”194 The trustee’s objection
was based on the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s adoption of the
Prigge approach.195 In In re Parks, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the most
reasonable interpretation of [Section] 541(b)(7)(A) is that it excludes from
property of the estate only those [voluntary retirement] contributions made
before the petition date.”196
Looking to its prior decision in In re Bruce, which involved a below-medianincome debtor, the bankruptcy court noted that its inquiry “went beyond the
analysis of Prigge and Parks.”197 In In re Bruce, the court held that “[Section]
541(b)(7)(A)(i)’s hanging paragraph excludes pre-petition voluntary retirement
contributions from the calculation of ‘current monthly income,’ i.e., those
contributions made during the six-month [current monthly income] look-back
period.”198 The court further explained:
If those contributions are deducted before determining the debtor’s
income during that six-month period pre-petition, those contributions
are not “disposable income” as that term is defined in [Section]
1325(b)(2), and the monthly average of the contributions during the
six-month period pre-petition should not be included in the calculation
of [current monthly income] for purposes of calculating disposable
income.199

The court found that its reasoning in In re Bruce also applied to above-median
debtors such as Anh-Thu Thi Vu because “calculating current monthly income
is the starting point for determining ‘disposable income’ under [Section]
1325(b)(2), regardless of whether the debtor is above-or below-medianincome.”200 Therefore, the court held that “voluntary retirement contributions
may be excluded from the calculation of disposable income, to the extent that

193
After deducting $877 from her disposable income, the debtor was left with $74 in monthly disposable
income. Id.
194
Id. at *1–2.
195
Id. at *7 (citing In re Parks, 475 B.R. 703, 708 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); Parks, 475 B.R. at 707 (“[W]e
find the Prigge line of cases persuasive. To avoid repetition, we borrow heavily from these decisions.”).
196
Parks, 475 B.R. at 707.
197
Vu, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1967, at *8 (citing In re Bruce, 484 B.R. 387, 394 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2012)).
198
Id. (citing Bruce, 484 B.R. at 394).
199
Id. (citing Bruce, 484 B.R. at 394).
200
Id. at *8.
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those contributions were being made pre-petition during the six-month lookback period used to determine” current monthly income.201
III. ANALYSIS: SHORTCOMINGS OF THE JOHNSON APPROACH
This Comment suggests that the In re Prigge and In re Seafort opinions—
which concluded that voluntary 401(k) contributions should not be excluded
from a debtor’s disposable income in chapter 13 cases—more effectively
comport with the goals of consumer bankruptcy than the In re Johnson
opinion.202 Further, the court’s interpretation of the hanging paragraph of
Section 541(b)(7) in In re Seafort provides an especially persuasive analysis of
voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions in bankruptcy in consideration of
Congress’s intent in enacting BAPCPA.203 The decisions of the In re Prigge and
In re Seafort courts are also consistent with the language of the IRS Standards,
as well as the Supreme Court’s pre-BAPCPA ruling in Patterson v. Shumate,
from which the In re Johnson court significantly departed.204
First, the exclusion of voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions from
disposable income gives debtors a “head start” instead of merely a “fresh start.”
Second, the Johnson court’s interpretation of the “hanging paragraph” of Section
541(b)(7) contradicts other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Third, the
treatment of voluntary post-petition contributions as “reasonably necessary” for
a debtor’s maintenance or support conflicts with the IRS Standards referenced
by the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Excluding Voluntary 401(k) Contributions from Disposable Income Gives
Debtors a “Head Start” Instead of Merely a “Fresh Start”
At the signing of the BAPCPA amendments on April 20, 2005, President
George W. Bush stated:
America is a nation of personal responsibility where people are
expected to meet their obligations. We’re also a nation of fairness and
compassion where those who need it most are afforded a fresh start.
The act of Congress I sign today will protect those who legitimately

201

Id. at *9.
See In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 677 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669
F.3d 662, 674 (6th Cir. 2012).
203
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 673.
204
See id. at 672 (“observing that the IRS guidelines state that voluntary retirement contributions are not
a necessary expense.”) (citing Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677). Compare Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992),
with Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
202
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need help, stop those who try to commit fraud, and bring greater
stability and fairness to our financial system. I’m honored to join the
members of Congress to sign the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act.205

His words echo the predominant theory among Congress,206 courts,207 and
scholars208—that consumer bankruptcy provides a fresh start to debtors.209 This
fresh start theory encompasses goals such as preventing debtors from becoming
public charges, protecting the interests of creditors, promoting an efficient an
uniform bankruptcy system, and safeguarding public and private interests.210
Maximizing the amount of assets in the bankruptcy estate protects the interests
of creditors,211 while “preserving certain assets necessary to provide a fresh start
so that the debtor’s future ability to earn and accumulate is not permanently
stunted” by bankruptcy safeguards the interests of debtors.212 These mechanisms
in the Bankruptcy Code function to maintain a balance between the rights and
interests of debtors and creditors.
Although the balance between debtors and creditors is not entirely equal,213
a fresh start is distinct from a “head start.” A head start equips the debtor with
more resources than needed to satisfy the goals of the fresh start, i.e., the survival
of the debtor and her dependents.214 While BAPCPA includes several retirement
protections, the “amount a debtor can protect from creditors using retirement
205
Presidential Statement on Signing the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act, 2005, 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 15 (Apr. 20, 2005).
206
See, e.g., REP. COMM’N BANKR. L. U.S., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 79–80 (1973).
207
See, e.g., Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541 (1885) (holding that “the policy of the Bankruptcy Act [of
1867] was, after taking from the bankrupt all his property not exempt by law, to discharge him from his debts
and liabilities, and enable him to take a fresh start”); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (holding that
“[s]ystems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has
become oppressive and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes”).
208
See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 91
(1999) (“Some scholars just reiterate the term fresh start in their justification, saying, for example, that debtors
should have an ‘opportunity to begin anew’ or a ‘chance to start over.’”).
209
See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 68 (2007).
210
Susan D. Franck, Comment, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church: Interpreting RFRA in the
Battle Among God, the Government, and the Bankruptcy Code, 81 MINN. L. REV. 981, 994 (1997).
211
Id. (citing Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (1987)).
212
Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355, 389
(1999) (internal marks omitted).
213
See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 815, 818 (1987).
214
Tedra Hobson, The Bankruptcy Abuse Creation Act?: Curing Unintended Consequences of Bankruptcy
Reform, 40 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1271 (2006).
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vehicles [is] set by the provisions of the Tax Code that govern them.”215 As a
result, there is a possibility that the debtor could obtain a head start in retirement
by allocating assets to 401(k) account contributions that are ordinarily available
to creditors. Under the Johnson majority, the debtor’s 401(k) account “would
essentially be financed by his creditors”216 because the assets are excluded from
disposable income, and therefore, are off-limits to creditors.
Indeed, allowing chapter 13 debtors to exclude “amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor”217
aligns with the policy goals of providing a fresh start.218 If the Bankruptcy Code
prohibited excluding portions of monthly income necessary for the maintenance
or support, the debtor’s ability to earn income needed for the chapter 13
repayment plan would be significantly impaired. Exclusions, therefore, are vital
to the debtor’s fresh start. However, the need for the debtor to contribute money
into a 401(k) account to earn income for chapter 13 plan repayment is less
compelling than maintenance or support. Moreover, contributing to a 401(k) is
not necessary for anyone’s ability, let alone the debtor’s, to earn income for
support or maintenance, as evidenced by the fact that nearly “a quarter of adults
in the U.S. have no retirement savings or pension at all.”219
B. The Majority’s Interpretation of the “Hanging Paragraph” of § 541(b)(7)
Contradicts Other Areas Within the Bankruptcy Code
The bankruptcy courts that grant chapter 13 debtors the ability to exclude
portions of earned income available to creditors for the purpose of making
voluntary 401(k) contributions consistently gloss over other areas within the
Bankruptcy Code, specifically Section 1322(f). Given the overwhelming
consensus that the Bankruptcy Code is “inelegantly drafted,” courts must adopt
“an interpretation from competing theories that is not only more consistent with
the language of the statute than the competing interpretations, but that is also
consistent with the legislative history and the overriding purpose of
215
Id. at 1271–72 & n.185 (citing ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 WITH ANALYSIS 6 (2005) (explaining all funds in
specified tax-exempt accounts are exempted from estate, except some IRAs are capped at $1 million unless
judge increases amount in interest of justice)).
216
Id. at 1272.
217
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
218
See generally In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809, 817 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Where the Debtor is assured
of an income sufficient to meet his basic needs, his fresh start is not imperiled.”).
219
Alicia Adamczyk, 25% of US Adults Have No Retirement Savings, CNBC: SAVE & INVEST (May 24,
2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/24/25-percent-of-us-adults-have-no-retirement-savings-fedfinds.html.
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BAPCPA.”220 The Johnson court, relying almost exclusively on the plain
language of the text, held that a chapter 13 debtor may make voluntary postpetition contributions to a 401(k), regardless of whether the debtor was making
401(k) contributions at the time of filing.221 Several bankruptcy courts later
adopted the Johnson majority’s interpretation of the hanging paragraph of
Section 541(b)(7).222
Under this viewpoint, debtors may fund their 401(k) plan and exclude such
contributions from their disposable income, subject to the good faith
requirement prescribed in Section 1325(a)(3) and the maximum contribution
limits imposed under nonbankruptcy law.223 In its analysis, the Johnson court
dodged the application of additional canons of statutory interpretation and,
instead, ended its inquiry after looking mainly at the plain meaning of the text.224
Ignoring other canons of statutory interpretation and relying exclusively on the
text’s plain meaning unfairly diminishes other relevant provisions of the Code
that address similarly situated exclusions and produces an absurd result, given
the purpose of the BAPCPA amendments.225 Since the Johnson decision “fail[s]
to explain why Congress, if it intended to enact a categorical exclusion from
disposable income for retirement contributions, did not use language similar to
that of Section 1322(f),”226 interpreting the hanging paragraph of Section
541(b)(7) demands a more extensive analysis of the text in relation to the entirety
of the Code.
Curiously, even though the Johnson court acknowledged the utility of
Section 1322(f) in determining whether the debtor could exclude money used to
repay her 401(k) loans, the court neglected to address Section 1322(f) when
deciding whether the debtor could exclude money used for her voluntary 401(k)
contributions. The Johnson court concluded that the language of Section
541(b)(7) was plain,227 meaning that the “sole function of the courts is to enforce
220
Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 671 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Baud v. Carroll, 634 F.3d
327, 357 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221
Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
222
See In re Gibson, 2009 LEXIS 2524, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Aug. 31, 2009); In re Mati, 390 B.R. 11,
15–17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849, 864–65 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007); In re Leahy, 370
B.R. 620, 623–24 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007); In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 864–66 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re
Nowlin, 366 B.R. 670, 676 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Njuguna, 357 B.R. 689, 690-91 (Bankr. D. N.H.
2006).
223
Johnson, 346 B.R. at 260–61.
224
See Id. at 263 (“Sections 541(b)(7) and 1322(f) both plainly state that these contributions ‘shall not
constitute disposable income.’”).
225
See Seafort v. Burden (In re Seafort), 669 F.3d 662, 670 (6th Cir. 2012).
226
Id.
227
Johnson, 346 B.R. at 263.
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[the provision] according to its terms unless the disposition required by the text
is absurd.”228 Although the Johnson court found nothing absurd about allowing
the debtor to repay her 401(k) loans while padding her retirement savings at the
expense of her creditors, the use of relevant canons of statutory interpretation
weakens the majority’s conclusion. The negative-implication canon, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius229—used by the Prigge and Seafort courts to reject
the Johnson holding230—provides a step in the right direction.
Congress put Section 1322(f)—the provision excluding 401(k) loan
repayments from disposable income—in chapter 13, while also placing the
hanging paragraph in chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although voluntary
401(k) contributions and 401(k) loan repayments are different conceptually,
both involve employer-sponsored retirement savings accounts.231 However,
because Congress deliberately placed the two provisions within separate
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, this shared characteristic does not support an
assumption that Congress intended for the uniform treatment of voluntary
401(k) contributions and 401(k) loan repayments. Rather, as the Prigge and
Seafort courts conclude, Congress’s decision to place the hanging paragraph
outside of the confines of chapter 13 is significant.232 Under the principle that
Congress purposefully omits,233 one could logically infer that there was no intent
to exempt post-petition 401(k) contributions from disposable income.
Furthermore, the Seafort court expanded its analysis beyond merely looking at

228
In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 673 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534
(2004)); see Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
229
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A canon of
construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative.”).
230
Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677; Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672.
231
Vanguard defines a 401(k) plan as a “defined contribution plan that allows employees to contribute
pre-tax dollars through salary deferral.” Supra note 76. Fidelity summarizes 401(k) loan repayment as:

With a 401(k) loan, you borrow money from your retirement savings account. Depending on
what your employer’s plan allows, you could take out as much as 50% of your savings, up to a
maximum of $50,000, within a 12-month period. Remember, you’ll have to pay that borrowed
money back, plus interest, within 5 years of taking your loan, in most cases.
Thinking of Taking Money out of a 401(k), FIDELITY: FIDELITY VIEWPOINTS (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.
fidelity.com/viewpoints/financial-basics/taking-money-from-401k.
232
See Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677; Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672.
233
See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
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Section 1322(f), turning instead toward other sections of the Bankruptcy Code
to provide greater clarity as to the meaning of the hanging paragraph.234
Whereas the Prigge court held that post-petition 401(k) contributions were
disposable income,235 the Seafort court looked at Sections 707(b)(2) and
1325(b)(3), as well as Section 541(b)(7) in the context of Section 541(a), to
ultimately conclude that post-petition 401(k) contributions should only be
excluded from disposable income if such contributions were made prepetition.236 Sections 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) outline several different types of
expenses that are permitted to reduce the amount of the debtor’s monthly income
available to creditors.237 Notably, voluntary 401(k) contributions are absent from
the long list of exclusions that seem to encompass everything from health
expenses to education costs.238 Based on the definition of 401(k),239 one could
argue that nearly every expense listed in Section 707(b)(2)(A) addresses a need
that would arise during the span of the debtor’s chapter 13 repayment plan.
Because a 401(k) plan addresses future needs, it is distinct from the other
expenses explicitly listed in Section 707(b)(2)(A). The canon ejusdem generis
suggests that Congress considers voluntary 401(k) contributions to be outside of
the purview of the “reasonable and necessary expenses” deductible from
“disposable income.”240
However, the Seafort court departed from the Prigge court’s analysis
because of the very existence of the hanging paragraph of Section 541(b)(7).241
The fact that Congress specifically added the hanging paragraph to Section
541(b)(7), as opposed to placing the hanging paragraph in a chapter 13 section
such as Section 1322(f), provides strong support that the hanging paragraph
should be read in the context of Section 541. As discussed previously, Section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses property of the estate.242 Section 541(a)
outlines what property is included in the estate,243 while subsection (b) outlines
what property is not included in the estate.244 When read together, as the Seafort
234

Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672–74.
Prigge, 441 B.R. at 677–78.
236
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 671–74.
237
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2018).
238
See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii).
239
401(k), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
240
Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A canon of construction holding that
when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include
only items of the same class as those listed.”).
241
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672–73.
242
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018).
243
Id. § 541(a).
244
Id. § 541(b).
235
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court explains, Sections 541(a)(1) and (b) define property of the estate “by what
is included and excluded at a fixed point in time—as of commencement of the
bankruptcy case.”245 This interpretation, unlike the Johnson majority’s reading
of Section 541(b)(7), places greater weight on Congress’s specific placement of
the hanging paragraph.
C. Treating Voluntary 401(k) Contributions as “Reasonably Necessary” for a
Debtor’s Maintenance Conflicts with the IRS Standards Referenced in the
Bankruptcy Code
Several bankruptcy courts have considered the IRS Standards in determining
whether post-petition 401(k) contributions are disposable income. The
Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is one example of a
judge relying on the IRS Standards in deciding whether a debtor may include
post-petition 401(k) contributions as disposable income under Section
707(b)(2)(A)(ii).246 In In re Lenton, the trustee moved to dismiss the debtor’s
chapter 7 case because the trustee did not consider the debtor’s monthly 401(k)
retirement plan loan payments to be a necessary expense.247 The debtor argued
that his monthly 401(k) loan repayments constituted involuntary deductions
under the other necessary expenses category found in the Internal Revenue
Manual.248 The court observed that the monthly 401(k) repayments were “not a
condition of [the] [d]ebtor’s job, but rather a condition of his [l]oans.”249
The debtor also cited the language of then-Form B22A’s presumption of
abuse worksheet250 as evidence, contending that “because the Form B22A
language cautions that discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory 401(k)
contributions are not included as a [sic] necessary expenses, the converse, i.e.,
payroll deductions for mandatory 401(k) loan repayments, is an allowable
expense.”251 The debtor’s argument did not persuade the court, which ultimately
245
Seafort, 669 F.3d at 672–73 (agreeing with McCullers that “for this reason, the Johnson line of cases
are not persuasive because they do not read § 541(b)(7) within the larger context of § 541 as a whole”).
246
See In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 656–57 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2006).
247
Id. at 653–54.
248
Id. at 656–57.
249
Id. at 657.
250
Line 26 of Form BB2A stated: “Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the
total average monthly payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement
contributions, union dues and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.” U.S. CTS., Official Form B22A: Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test
Calculation 1, 3 (2005) (available at https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/?ID=983) (emphasis added).
The current version of Form B22A is Form 122A-2. U.S. CTS., Official Form 122A-2: Chapter 7 Means Test
Calculation (2019) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_122a-2.pdf).
251
Lenton, 358 B.R. at 657.
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found that the “retirement contributions were discretionary and therefore not a
requirement of the job.”252 Relying on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Anes,
the court concluded that the “fact that Debtor took a loan against those funds
under loan terms that mandate repayment by payroll deduction does not change
the nature of the funds when Debtor repays them.”253
The Johnson approach—which serves as the basis for most courts that
exclude post-petition 401(k) contributions from the debtor’s disposable
income—relies almost exclusively on the plain meaning of the hanging
paragraph in Section 541(b)(7). Revisiting the Johnson decision, the court
neglected to consider the IRS Standards in analyzing whether the Bankruptcy
Code permitted the debtor to exclude post-petition 401(k) contributions from
disposable income, yet relied heavily on the IRS Standards in assessing the
trustee’s objection to the debtor’s “payments on car loans and leases.”254 The
Johnson court acknowledged that the IRS National and Local Standards “seem
to reflect amounts that Congress deems reasonably necessary regardless of a
debtor’s actual expenses.”255 As stated earlier, the IRS National Standards
account for Food, Clothing and Other Items and “Out of Pocket Health Care
Expenses.”256 A review of these provisions reveals they neglect to mention
anything even remotely resembling a 401(k) plan contribution, let alone any
other kind of retirement account.257
The Johnson court determined that “[b]y incorporating [the IRS Allowances
for Other Necessary Expenses], BAPCPA explicitly authorizes deductions for
expenses that were not previously recognized by the Bankruptcy Code.”258
Examples of Other Necessary Expenses include “life insurance premiums,
health insurance, health savings accounts, childcare, personal security, phones,

252
Id. The court reasoned that “[i]f future voluntary contributions to the 401k plan are not necessary
expenses, it is hard to argue that the replenishment of past voluntary contributions to the 401k account by
repaying loans is a necessary expense.” Id. at 658.
253
Id. (citing Anes v. Dehart (In re Anes), 195 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999)).

In finding that repayment of loans from a retirement account should not be deducted from
disposable income under § 1325, the Court reasoned that the payments, while classified as debt
payments, will increase the debtor’s retirement benefits and in such situation “[in] effect, the
[loan] payments are contributions to the Debtors’ retirement accounts.”
Id. (citing Anes, 195 F.3d at 180).
254
Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256, 266 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).
255
Id. at 265.
256
IRM §§ 5.15.1.9(1), (5) (Aug. 29, 2018).
257
IRM § 5.15.1.9(1)(A)–(E) (Aug. 29, 2018).
258
Johnson, 346 B.R. at 267.
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internet, and other education costs.”259 This IRS standard also fails to mention
any type of retirement plan contribution. The court then turned to then-Form
B22C,260 which in the court’s words, “corresponds to the Code’s definition of
current monthly income.”261 Referencing the current version of Form B22C, the
court concluded that “[t]here is no bad faith where a debtor simply computes
[current monthly income] using the Code’s mechanical definition.”262 At the
same time, the Johnson court ignored the “Code’s mechanical definition” of
Other Necessary Expenses—instructing debtors to “not include discretionary
amounts, such as non-mandatory 401(k) contributions”263 when calculating
exclusions from disposable income in its post-petition 401(k) contribution
analysis.264
The Prigge court, however, looked to the IRS guidelines referenced in the
Bankruptcy Code to reach the conclusion that voluntary retirement plans are not
a necessary expense.265 The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Egebjerg, where the court noted “that the IRS guidelines themselves provide
that ‘[c]ontributions to voluntary retirement plans are not a necessary
expense.’”266 Specifically, the court explained:
We do not hold that [IRM] § 5.15.1.23 is controlling, but that it is
useful and persuasive in the context of this case—defining the
parameters of [IRM] § 5.15.1.10(1) and what was considered to
provide for “health and welfare” at the time Congress cross-referenced
the IRM’s “Other Necessary Expenses” provisions. . . . By our narrow
decision today, we do not mean to imply that the IRS standards have
been incorporated wholesale into the Bankruptcy Code or that they
control outcomes on other issues.267

259
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) and U.S. CTS., Official Form B22C: Statement of Current Monthly
Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income (2005) (available at https://www.id.
uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/?ID=992)).
260
The current version of Form B22C is broken up into two separate forms. See U.S. CTS., Official Form
122C-1: Chapter 13 Statement of Your Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period (2020)
(available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b122c-1.pdf); U.S. CTS., Official Form 122C-2:
Chapter 13 Calculation of Your Disposable Income (2019) (available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/form_b_122c-2.pdf).
261
Johnson, 346 B.R. at 268 (internal marks omitted).
262
Id. at 269.
263
U.S. CTS., Official Form B22C: Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment
Period and Disposable Income (2005) (available at https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/?ID=992).
264
See Johnson, 346 B.R. at 269.
265
In re Prigge, 441 B.R. 667, 676 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010).
266
Id. (quoting Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
citations omitted)).
267
Id. (quoting Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1052).
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In Egebjerg, the Ninth Circuit examined 401(k) loan repayments in the
context of the IRS’s Other Necessary Expenses within Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)
of the Bankruptcy Code.268 The court found that 401(k) loan repayments were
distinguishable from the “fifteen categories of expenses which may be
considered necessary under certain circumstances.”269
To explain why 401(k) loan repayments “do not fit within any of the IRM’s
listed categories,” the Egebjerg court reasoned that “the 401(k) loan repayments
themselves are voluntary in the sense that [the debtor] can simply ask the loan
administrator to treat his outstanding loan balance as an early withdrawal from
his 401(k) and thereby relieve himself of a future repayment obligation.”270
Although the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry dealt with 401(k) loan repayments as
opposed to voluntary 401(k) contributions, the court’s rationale highlights an
important difference between retirement contributions and other categories
“such as child care, education and court-ordered payments such as alimony and
child support.”271 In the case of voluntary 401(k) contributions, consider a
scenario where a chapter 13 debtor makes this kind of early withdrawal from
their 401(k) account after the end of their repayment period. In this scenario, the
debtor would essentially prevent unsecured creditors from receiving a portion of
their disposable income, while allowing that portion of their income to grow in
a 401(k) account. And as the Egebjerg court notes, “[d]oing so would have tax
consequences, but [the debtor] would retain the use of most of the money.”272
CONCLUSION
A debtor receives a “head start” if they exit chapter 13 with more resources
than are needed to fulfill the goal of consumer bankruptcy: a fresh start.
Compared with the pre-BAPCPA consensus view among federal courts that
post-petition contributions were part of a debtor’s “disposable income” under
Section 1325(b)(2), the majority approach bestows debtors with a head start. The
vague outlines set forth in the Bankruptcy Code have enabled bankruptcy judges
to arbitrarily decide whether voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions are
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor.

268
See Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1051 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“Under the statutory provisions
governing the means test, debtors may deduct, in addition to payments on secured debt, their ‘actual monthly
expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service.’”)).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id. (citing IRM § 5.15.1.10 (Aug. 29, 2018)).
272
Id.
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First, excluding voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions from
disposable income gives debtors a “head start” instead of merely a “fresh start.”
Second, the prevailing interpretation of the “hanging paragraph” of Section
541(b)(7) contradicts other provisions within the Bankruptcy Code. Third, the
majority’s treatment of voluntary post-petition contributions as “reasonably
necessary” for a debtor’s maintenance or support conflicts with the IRS
Standards referenced by the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, courts would do well
to adopt the Prigge or Seafort approach to remedy the unintended consequence
of the Johnson approach—that shielding voluntary post-petition 401(k)
contributions from creditors invites abuse by debtors. Moreover, given the fresh
start goal of consumer bankruptcy and the current imbalance between debtors
and creditors, there lies a strong argument for amending the Bankruptcy Code
to clearly indicate that voluntary post-petition 401(k) contributions are
disposable income.
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